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Foreword 
This paper is part of a series of studies funded by the European Commission in the 
framework of a project of the International Labour Organization (ILO) on “Promoting a 
balanced and inclusive recovery from the crisis in Europe through sound industrial 
relations and social dialogue”. The project falls under a recent partnership agreement 
between the ILO and the European Commission, which aims to study the impact of the 
crisis and crisis-response policies on national tripartite social dialogue, collective 
bargaining and labour law in the Member States of the ILO and the European Union (EU), 
and the role of social dialogue actors and institutions in this context. The project builds on 
ILO research initiated since 2008 on best practices in the area of crisis responses, and the 
Global Jobs Pact adopted by the International Labour Conference in June 2009. 
This study on Spain by Oscar Molina and Fausto Migueléz (Autonomous University 
of Barcelona, Spain) shows that social dialogue is facing challenges and tensions in the 
context of austerity policies and institutional reforms. During the two decades preceding 
the crisis, social dialogue in Spain played a fundamental role and was a distinctive trait of 
industrial relations. As a result of the financial and debt crisis, Spain has witnessed an 
unprecedented period of reforms and economic adjustment. In this context, social dialogue 
as a tool for socio-economic governance has been questioned for both its legitimacy and 
effectiveness. The crisis has put the Government and social partners under great pressure 
to introduce reforms in a short period of time and under a rapidly worsening socio-
economic context. To a certain degree, the exogenous pressure to implement reforms and 
austerity has reduced the space for the Government to seek consensus – a phenomenon 
observed in many other countries of the European Union under the pressure of financial 
crisis and austerity to varying degrees. While these problems are mostly related to tripartite 
social dialogue, bipartite social dialogue has proved to be more resilient and has continued 
delivering important agreements. 
An earlier version of the paper was presented and debated at the ILO-EU research 
workshop on “The governance of policy reforms in Europe: Social dialogue actors and 
institutions in times of economic downturn and austerity” (28-29 May 2012, Geneva, 
Switzerland). 
The responsibility for opinions expressed in this paper rests solely with its authors, 
and its publication does not constitute an endorsement by the Governance and Tripartism 
Department of the International Labour Office, or the European Commission.  
 
  Moussa Oumarou 
Director, 
Governance and Tripartism 
Department 
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Introduction 
The economic and sovereign debt crises are having a particularly strong impact on Spain 
and its economy and labour market in comparison with other EU countries. This 
asymmetrical situation is the result of the structural weaknesses and imbalances of the 
Spanish economy and the construction-based growth pattern it has followed in the years 
preceding the economic crisis (Godino and Molina 2011; Recio 2011). In an effort to cope 
with the economic and labour market crisis, Spain has undergone an unprecedented period 
of reforms, particularly from early 2010 onwards. Not only have there been many changes 
in labour market regulation, employment policy and industrial relations (six in a two-year 
period), but in many aspects these have implied an overhaul of the existing institutional 
edifice. The sovereign debt crisis has been a real turning point in the reform process as it 
has put the Government and social partners under strong pressure to introduce reforms in a 
short period and under a rapidly worsening socio-economic context. However, despite the 
resulting significant changes in existing labour market institutions, the economy is still in 
recession, unemployment is increasing and most of the structural socio-economic 
imbalances remain or have worsened (Fishman 2012). 
It is argued that the internal devaluation strategy imposed as a consequence of the 
country’s EU membership and its associated austerity policies are affecting the role of 
social partners and will have a long-lasting impact on the institutional social dialogue 
pillars and dominant forms of coordination in the economy. The debt crisis has led to the 
implementation of austerity packages aiming to reduce public deficits and the debt burden. 
Moreover, a constitutional reform has established a ceiling on fiscal deficit and has made 
fiscal austerity and debt repayment a priority in the Government’s fiscal policy. However, 
little attention has been paid to the correction of the structural imbalances of the Spanish 
economy. Fiscal adjustment has been based on spending cuts, though more recently there 
has also been an increase in both direct and indirect taxation. As a consequence of the 
process of fiscal consolidation, some public services like health and education have 
experienced a significant drop in budget resources, an increase in private management and 
delivery, and a move away from universal coverage. 
But the consequences of austerity policies go far beyond the economic realm. They 
are also affecting democratic governance and by implication social dialogue. Tripartite 
social dialogue has been under stress and has de facto been abandoned in recent months 
while bipartite social dialogue has continued delivering important agreements. The 
perceived reasons for the abandonment of tripartite social dialogue are multifarious as the 
interviews (conducted for the purpose of this paper) with social partners and Government 
members have made clear. On the one hand, the position of social partners as political 
actors has been put into question by part of the population and social movements like the 
15-M or indignados (the outraged). The main reason for this criticism has been their 
inability to reach agreements in the period 2008-2010 on the reform of collective 
bargaining or the labour market; there is a widespread perception that social dialogue has 
failed to deliver timely results at a delicate juncture for the country. At the same time, the 
imposition of reforms by supranational authorities has reduced the legitimating role of 
social dialogue for the Government.  
In addition to reasons closely connected with the economic context, the interviews 
have raised other possible explanations. First of all, the fiscal constraints have limited the 
opportunities for engaging in mutually profitable forms of political exchange, hence 
narrowing the field for tripartite agreements in a context of weak institutionalization of 
social dialogue. Moreover, the trade unions have raised the ideology of the governing party 
as an important factor in the establishment of trends for tripartite social dialogue and 
especially its abandonment since the early months of 2012. The characteristics and 
leadership of the peak organizations have also been identified as a determinant of the 
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evolution and outcomes of social dialogue, and in particular the difficulties it experienced 
in the 2009-2010 period. Finally, a recurrent argument in the case of Spain is the weak 
organizational coordination between trade unions and employer organizations, which is 
incompatible with stable tripartism as it hinders the effectiveness of pacts.1 
It is nonetheless important to highlight the existence of some significant agreements. 
These include the two Inter-Confederal Agreements on Employment and Collective 
Bargaining signed in 2009 (AENC-I) and 2012 (AENC-II), as well as the 2011 Tripartite 
Social and Economic Agreement.  
However, social dialogue has failed to deliver far-reaching consensus on labour 
market reform and collective bargaining. More recently, tripartite social dialogue has been 
definitely abandoned. Thus recent developments seem to point towards a qualitative 
change. Labour market reforms have historically been preceded by negotiations and only 
when these failed could the Government opt for regulating on the issues concerned. In 
contrast social dialogue has been absent from the drafting of the most recent 2012 labour 
market reform proposal. 
The Spanish labour market has been more volatile than any other EU market. 
Unemployment has risen faster, confirming a pattern similar to the one exhibited in the 
crises of the early 1990s. Even though there was a consensus among the relevant actors 
that labour market developments have not been responsive to changes in labour market 
regulations, the emphasis of most labour market reforms has been placed on changing legal 
aspects. An analysis of the discourse and perception of relevant actors shows that all of 
them considered it impossible to create employment under the current context but, as will 
be seen below, they proposed different remedies and mechanisms to halt the rapid process 
of job destruction.  
One of the principles orienting these reforms has been the reduction of the duality 
between temporary/fixed-term and open-ended contracts. However, the approach and 
content of the reforms varied significantly in the period under consideration. In the first 
stage, reforms aimed at enhancing active labour market policies,2 improving internal and 
functional flexibility3 while introducing minor changes in dismissal regulation. This was 
the approach followed in the 2010 and 2011 reforms, whose objective was to maintain the 
underlying equilibrium in labour market regulation.4 However, the 2012 reform made a 
Copernican shift in the orientation of labour market reforms as it focused on firing and 
dismissal costs. 
The reforms during the current economic crisis also modified collective bargaining 
rules and structures. In addition to guaranteeing wage moderation, the modifications aimed 
at achieving a better link between real wages and productivity, both over time and across 
sectors or regions. This led to changes in the structure of collective bargaining, paving the 
way for a decentralized system based on the extension of opting-out clauses for companies. 
The management of the system is carried out from below, i.e. by the company, instead of 
from above, i.e. through sectoral agreements. The 2012 reform enhanced the unilateral 
regulatory capacity of the employer.  
                                                          
1
 According to Crouch (1993: 54-55), an articulated organization is one in which strong relations of 
interdependence bind different vertical levels such that the actions of the centre are frequently predicated on 
securing the consent of lower levels, and the autonomous action of lower levels is bound by rules of delegation, 
with the scope for discretion ultimately controlled by successively higher levels. 
2
 Active labour market policies are those aimed at helping unemployed people back to work including job 
placement services, benefits administration, and labour market programmes such as training and job creation (see 
http://www.oecd.org/els/emp/activelabourmarketpoliciesandactivationstrategies.htm). 
3
 Internal numerical flexibility has to do with the legal and contractual framework to adjust working hours. It 
accordingly includes working shifts, weekends, and variable or irregular hours. Functional flexibility is captured 
by the possibility to employ workers in different jobs.  
4
 Interview with representative of the Ministry of Labour and Immigration. 
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The reforms also introduced procedural changes in the regulation of collective 
bargaining in order to facilitate and speed up the renewal of existing agreements. These 
included changes in collective dispute resolution mechanisms. Although the social partners 
have defended their autonomy in regard to the reform of collective bargaining, the 
Government passed some measures without waiting for the agreement of trade unions and 
employers. In some cases, the reforms led both to a regression of collective rights and to 
the undermining of the autonomy of the social actors. 
This paper is organized in three sections. Section I provides the economic, 
institutional and political context in which austerity measures have been implemented and 
gives particular attention to the structural imbalances that have characterized the Spanish 
economy. Section II analyses the development of social dialogue in austerity times and 
emphasizes the processes involved in the negotiation of labour market and collective 
bargaining reforms. Section III discusses the impact of adjustment policies on the labour 
market, industrial relations and social dialogue. Section IV provides some concluding 
remarks and proposals on possible ways to revitalize tripartite social dialogue. 
1.  Economic and political context 
The sovereign debt crisis is having a deeper and longer-lasting impact in Spain than in 
other European countries owing to the confluence of several causes. First, Spain shares 
with the other southern European economies a low and stagnant productivity that is related 
to its production structure and pattern of economic specialization (Mas et al. 2012). 
Second, it shared with Ireland a housing bubble leading to an unprecedented development 
of the construction sector and a rapid increase in private indebtedness (López and 
Rodríguez 2011). Finally, the quasi-federal state structure based on Comunidades 
Autónomas (Autonomous Communities or regions, of which Spain has 17, each with its 
own government) has led to the growth of overlapping institutions and competences and 
increasing public expenditure managed at the regional level. This unique problem load 
differentiates Spain from the other European countries most affected by the debt crisis and 
it must be taken into consideration when interpreting economic and labour market 
developments in the country.  
Before the financial and debt crises, some commentators described Spain as a 
success story because of its employment creation record, an increasing gross domestic 
product (GDP) per capita and low unemployment.5 However, after four years of 
unprecedented job destruction, Spain’s economy seems to be moving closer to a new 
recession (OECD 2010, European Commission 2011). Unemployment is still increasing 
and had already reached five million people by June 2012, equivalent to almost 25 per cent 
of the active population. Most analysts agree that 2013 will also register negative growth 
and worsening labour market conditions (European Commission 2012). GDP per capita 
has fallen to 2002 levels, and inequalities have grown alarmingly, challenging social 
cohesion in a context of declining coverage of unemployment benefits and social spending 
cuts. Spain lost an opportunity in the pre-crisis years to overcome some of the historical 
problems that made the country lag behind its neighbours. It is likely to face enormous 
difficulties to recover a growth path and catch up with continental and northern Europe.  
1.1 The structural determinants of the economic 
crisis in Spain  
In the early months of 2008 it was difficult to imagine that the crisis would be so deep and 
enduring. Even though the first symptoms of economic deceleration were already 
                                                          
5
 See for example http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a99i9z4lMUns. 
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noticeable, the general feeling was that the Spanish economy was in a strong position to 
face deterioration in the international economy whatever its origin and intensity.6  
As has been already mentioned, an overemphasis on the exogenous and financial 
character of the crisis contributed to the shift in attention away from the structural 
domestic problems of the Spanish economy (Fishman 2012). Despite the fact that some 
voices had raised an alarm about the weaknesses of a growth model based on bricks and 
mortar (OECD 2007), the economic policy since the mid-1990s did not correct the path 
taken by the economy. The Socialist Government elected in 2008 argued first that there 
was no crisis and then blamed external factors for its inception and intensity. The 
economic policy paralysis that characterized its early months was rooted in a belief that the 
economy was well prepared for a temporary shock and little action was needed 
accordingly. 
In the early stages of the crisis increases in unemployment were to a large extent 
driven by a severe contraction of the construction sector (CES 2009). However, as job 
destruction spread to most sectors of the economy, other factors had to be given attention. 
The first aspect to be considered was the difficulty companies were having in accessing 
credit because of the banks’ increasing restrictions on lending. In spite of the essentially 
financial character of the economic crisis, the banking system in Spain appeared not to be 
as badly hit in its early months as banks in other countries. The general feeling was that the 
largest private banks in Spain were well buffered and provisioned. However, as the 
economic crisis evolved, banks became more vulnerable and a target of citizens’ 
discontent. In this context, the small regional savings banks (cajas) were found to be in an 
extremely weak position. Some of them were rescued and large-scale mergers occurred. 
The vulnerability of the banking industry was to a large extent due to its policy of 
providing easy access to credit in the growth years. In fact, the excessive resort to 
borrowing by individuals seeking to finance private consumption was a feature of the 
Spanish growth model.  
Crouch’s notion of privatized Keynesianism (Crouch 2008) becomes particularly 
insightful in this regard. The growth of the Spanish economy in 1998-2007 was strongly 
dependent on the additional resources provided to families by easy access to credit. This 
dependence was brought about by the housing bubble which had the effect of reducing the 
disposable income of a large number of families when housing prices rose rapidly. These 
almost doubled between 2000 and 2008. As López and Rodríguez (2011: 11) note, “Deficit 
spending in the years 1997–2007 was decisively transferred from the Spanish State to 
private households, which, in the final years of the cycle, became net demanders of 
financing.” 
                                                          
6
 This is confirmed by the Labour Minister at that time, Mr. Celestino Corbacho. 
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Figure 1.  Inflation and negotiated wages in Spain, 1980-2012  
 
Source: INE, National Statistics Institute.  
The other reasons for the excessive reliance on credit are related to labour market 
conditions. These include the low wages and fixed-term contracts of a significant 
percentage of employees. The high rate of temporary employment characterized by 
instability and wage levels lower than those earned by employees with similar 
qualifications on open-ended contracts (Jimeno and Toharia 1993, Amuedo and Serrano 
2005), together with the moderate wage increases that have prevailed since the mid-1990s 
(see figure 1) thanks to bipartite agreements, have made it necessary for individuals to look 
for additional financial resources in a situation of moderate inflation but skyrocketing 
housing prices.  
This evidence goes strongly against another recurrent argument to explain the 
structural problems of the Spanish economy and those of other southern European 
countries, i.e. excessive wage increases (Carballo-Cruz 2011, Wölfl and Mora 2011). 
According to this argument, the lack of capacities for coordinating bargaining processes in 
southern Europe triggered an increase in unit labour costs and the consequent deterioration 
in national current account balances. On the basis of this argument, the Spanish social 
partners and the Government were asked to further restrain wage increases.  
However, when one looks at the outcomes of the bargaining process in terms of 
negotiated wage increases, the picture is one of considerable wage moderation. Figure 1 
indeed shows how, since the late 1990s, average negotiated wage increases have moved 
along with inflation and in some years have triggered losses in earnings’ purchasing 
power. This evidence is reinforced by the evolution of the adjusted labour share or real unit 
labour costs which have declined since the early 1980s (Arpaia and Pichelman 2009). 
Only when productivity is taken into account does a clear picture of the real 
structural limitations of the Spanish economy begin to emerge, with its implications for 
understanding the extent and duration of the current crisis. As a matter of fact, when the 
evolution of wages and productivity through real unit labour costs is examined, the picture 
changes significantly, particularly when comparing Spain with other EU economies (see 
figure 2). 
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Figure 2.  Real unit labour costs, 1996-2012  
 
Source: Eurostat  
The inability of three labour market reforms in two years to maintain employment 
levels and halt the increase in unemployment confirms that labour market regulations are 
not directly responsible for the deterioration in labour market performance. As figure 3 
shows, the unemployment rate has maintained a steady upward trend, rising to almost 
25 per cent in June 2012. This could be interpreted as a sign that the roots of labour market 
underperformance have little to do with employment regulations and are related to the 
structural weaknesses of the Spanish economy. 
Figure 3.  Unemployment rate by age group, 2005-2012 
 
Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE), Labour Force Survey.  
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concern for this group is also caused by the existence of a large number of early school 
leavers in the growth years. Many of these young workers now face long-term 
unemployment and little prospects of finding a job because of their low level of education. 
Women and immigrant workers also suffer from above-average unemployment levels. 
The high and rapidly growing unemployment rate has been accompanied since 2010 
by a drop in the coverage provided by unemployment benefits (figure 4). This has been 
due to the temporal accumulation of the unemployed receiving contributory benefits as 
well as to the 2009 extension approved by the Socialist Government under the PRODI 
programme.7  
The Government was well aware of the need to concentrate resources on passive 
employment policies in a period of high uncertainty, increasing unemployment and the 
uncertain effectiveness of active labour market policies.8 However, the drop in 
unemployment benefits since early 2010 accompanied by rising unemployment has led to 
an increasingly large number of unemployed persons receiving no benefit. Furthermore, 
about 50 per cent of those entitled to benefits actually receive non-contributory 
unemployment assistance, which is significantly less generous than contributory benefits, 
in effect pushing the already big number of persons receiving no or little benefits to an 
even higher level.  
Figure 4.  Unemployment benefit coverage, 2006-2012 
 
Source: Based on social security data. 
Summing up, the real structural limitation of the Spanish economy has been low and 
stagnant productivity (Mas et al. 2012). Three elements are particularly important in the 
context of the growth experienced by the Spanish economy since the late 1990s. The first 
is the sectoral composition of GDP and the imbalanced growth path with the massive 
contribution of the non-tradable and strongly labour-intensive construction and tourism 
sectors. The second is the high rate of temporary employment which diminishes the 
incentives of both employers and employees to invest in specific skills and reduces future 
productivity (Dolado and Stucchi 2008, Ortega and Marchante 2010). Finally, the massive 
inflow of immigrant workers during the last ten years and the incorporation of mostly 
medium- to low-skilled workers in the service and construction sectors have helped keep 
                                                          
7
 Programa Temporal de Protección por Desempleo e Inserción (Temporary Unemployment Protection and 
Inclusion Programme). 
8
 Interview with representative of the Ministry of Labour and Immigration. 
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wages low at a time when labour market shortages were pushing wages up. Moreover, the 
availability of an immigrant labour force has led some companies to opt for labour-
intensive techniques. 
1.2 The policy and political context 
While evidence of a significant economic deceleration and a likely recession was already 
available to the Spanish Government by early 2008 as the unemployment rate reached 11.3 
per cent in May of that year, the Government did not take any action. Only some months 
later did the Government accept the existence of an “accelerated deceleration" that had an 
exogenous character, leading it to start to enact measures aimed at encouraging economic 
revitalization. These consisted mostly of fiscal stimulus combining tax reduction with an 
increase in spending. 
The increase in spending due to growing unemployment and public investment 
programmes as well as a sharp drop in revenues pushed deficit figures rapidly from a 
1.9 per cent surplus in 2007 to a 4.2 per cent deficit in just one year. The deterioration in 
labour market conditions was obvious in the 18 per cent unemployment rate in 2009 and 
the rise in the long-term unemployment level to 4.3 per cent. Because of the high level of 
temporary employment, many of the people becoming unemployed were entitled to low 
unemployment benefits or none at all. At the same time, as the economic crisis deepened, 
many of those who were on open-ended contracts before they became unemployed also 
started to exhaust their unemployment protection with the consequent threat to social 
cohesion.  
The Government acknowledged the structural character of the crisis and hence the 
need to introduce more radical reforms only when Spain’s labour market and 
macroeconomic conditions had deteriorated noticeably in comparison with those in other 
EU countries. Until that time, the Government was convinced that little could be done 
against a crisis with an essentially financial and exogenous character.  
As a consequence of the worsening fiscal position of southern European countries 
and Ireland, fears of default led to the euro sovereign debt crisis. The average deficit of the 
European Union had increased from -0.9 per cent of GDP in 2007 to -6.8 per cent in 2009. 
In the case of Spain, it was worse, rising from 1.9 per cent (2007) to an unprecedented 
-11.1 per cent (2009). Until 2009, the strategy for exiting the crisis had been mostly 
regarded as a domestic affair, with each country expected to develop its own policies. 
However, as the debt crisis deepened, the EU adopted a more active role and put pressure 
on the Spanish Government to implement significant cost-cutting measures. 
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Figure 5.  Deficits in the European Union and Spain, 2002-2011 
(as percentage of GDP) 
 
Source: Eurostat 
The meeting of the Eurogroup in early May 2010 concluded with strong demands on 
the Spanish Government to implement austerity policies. As a result, on 12 May, the 
Government presented a set of "measures to accelerate the reduction of public deficit”. 
These included a 5 per cent cut in the salaries of civil servants, along with a freeze on wage 
increases in the forthcoming years, non-application of cost-of-living indexation to 
pensions, removal of the cheque bebé (allowance of €2500 to families with newborn 
children) and a significant reduction in public works and investment. As a result of the 
adjustment programme, the budget deficit went down from -11.1 per cent in 2010 to -9.2 
per cent in just one year. Further advances in the implementation of austerity packages 
consisting mostly of cost-cutting measures, with little emphasis on revenue-based 
adjustment or policies to stimulate demand, certainly constitute a threat for growth and the 
provision of public services.  
After eight years of left-wing governments, the general elections held in November 
2011 marked a shift towards the right-wing Partido Popular (PP) headed by Mariano 
Rajoy. Right after the election, the Government announced an ambitious reform plan. 
Generally speaking, economic policies under the PP Government have been characterized 
by some continuity with the policies of the previous Government. However, there are 
differences that need to be stressed. From the point of view of the policy agenda, austerity 
measures are more aggressive in areas such as health and education. In regard to the 
governance of adjustment, the new Government has adopted a more unilateral approach.  
2.  The policy process: Social dialogue and 
negotiated adjustment in austerity times 
The previous section has provided the context for the analysis of social dialogue. An ill-
advised and late diagnosis of the challenges facing the economy in the early months of the 
crisis, resulting in costly and largely ineffective policies, not only hampered the recovery 
but also aggravated the conditions in which Spain had to face the sovereign debt crisis 
since 2010. As will be explored in this section, another important factor to be considered is 
the lack of broad political and socio-economic consensus which has further limited the 
effectiveness of policy responses. 
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The above considerations about the economy and politics have to be interpreted in 
the context of a deep and multifaceted governance crisis. On the one hand, there is an 
increasing perception among citizens about the need to restructure the governance of the 
political system. This is thought to suffer gaps in both its institutions and the functioning 
and representativeness of its political parties. The social partners, and more specifically 
trade unions, have also been criticized by a large sector of society (including the 15-M 
Movement and the Indignados). They are accused of not having provided an alternative 
policy and to have been too accommodating to both the PP and the Socialist Party’s (the 
Partido Socialista Obrero Español, PSOE) reform agenda because of the extent of their 
institutionalization and dependence on state resources.  
The two major labour confederations have recently acknowledged the failure of 
trade unions as part of the institutional and political system to channel the citizens’ 
demands.9 These demands have been aggravated by the perception that fiscal adjustment 
has been imposed by the technocratic EU economic governance. Moreover, the negative 
impact of this adjustment on social cohesion threatens the stability and the pillars of the 
governance system built in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The Indignados Movement can 
in this context be interpreted as an expression of this political and economic discontent 
(Armingeon and Baccaro 2011). 
Adjustment policies have been characterized by a shared diagnosis of the problems 
affecting the Spanish economy but significant differences have been observed as to the 
policies required to deal with these problems. Following a first period of inaction, initial 
responses to the crisis consisted of fiscal measures to stimulate the economy. These were 
then followed by a shift to austerity measures combining spending cuts and tax increases. 
This change only took place when the risks of contagion of the Greek sovereign debt crisis 
became evident in early and mid-2010. As above noted, there was a certain continuity in 
the economic policies adopted by the Socialist (2010-2011) and PP (2011) governments. 
Furthermore, major shifts in the economic policy agenda were induced externally. 
However, spending cuts since the PP Government came to power in November 2011 have 
concentrated more on education and health than they did under the previous Socialist 
government.  
The role of social dialogue and its impact on the adjustment have varied with time 
and across policy fields. During its period in power, the Socialist Government maintained 
talks and permanent contact with social partners on a large number of issues including the 
labour market and industrial relations, employment policy, industrial policy, energy policy 
and environmental policy.10 However, the outcomes of this process have been judged by 
all actors involved as disappointing as no major agreement was signed. When the debt 
crisis put further pressure on the Government to act, it adopted a more unilateral approach 
in regulating several policy fields. However, in matters related to labour market and 
industrial relations, the Government continued to engage in tripartite dialogue before 
deciding reforms.  
Since taking power in 2011, the PP Government has adopted an approach which is 
based on unilateral decision-making and disregard of tripartite social dialogue. Tripartite 
social dialogue has played virtually no role in the design of economic policy and fiscal 
adjustment. When it did play a role, this dealt mostly with industrial policy, the labour 
market and collective bargaining. 
2.1 A historical overview of social dialogue 
in Spain 
Even though tripartite social dialogue in Spain has gone through several phases, it has 
played a fundamental role as a socio-economic governance mechanism since the country’s 
                                                          
9
 See http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2012/09/19/economia/1348047099.html 
10
 Interview with representatives of the Ministry of Labour and Immigration. 
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return to democracy. A series of social pacts in the early 1980s which contributed to 
economic adjustment at a time of deep industrial restructuring and economic crisis, was 
followed by increasing conflict between the Socialist Government and the trade unions, 
leading to the 1987 general strike.  
The economic crisis of the early 1990s was also characterized by a lack of consensus 
and conflict between the Government and the social partners, leading to the unilateral 
regulation of the labour market and collective bargaining and two general strikes in 1992 
and 1994. Bipartite and tripartite social dialogue resumed in 1995 and gained momentum 
under the right-wing Government elected in 1996. Several agreements were signed 
thereafter during a period of growth. It is particularly important to note the consolidation of 
permanent bipartite social dialogue between unions and employers, providing an anchor in 
the face of the instability of tripartite social dialogue.  
The second term of the right-wing Government coincided with increasing conflict 
and attempts at unilateral regulation of the labour market and social protection; this met the 
resistance of trade unions. The revitalization of tripartite social dialogue began in 2004 
with the election of the left-wing Government headed by Mr. José Luis Rodriguez 
Zapatero, while bipartite social dialogue has remained a central feature of industrial 
relations in Spain since the mid-1990s. 
One of the reasons for the above-described historical discontinuities in tripartite 
social dialogue is its late and weak institutionalization. A tripartite Social and Economic 
Council was created only in 1991. While the Council has provided a stable forum for 
relations among trade unions, employer organizations and the Government, its role has 
been limited to consultations. There is no formal procedure establishing the obligation for 
the Government to engage in negotiations with social partners on any policy aspect. 
Meaningful tripartite social dialogue is accordingly subject to socio-economic conditions 
and political discretion, i.e., to the Government’s willingness to negotiate the reforms. This 
notwithstanding, there is no clear correlation between the political ideology of the 
Government and tripartite social dialogue (Molina and Rhodes 2011).  
Other explanations point to electoral politics (Hamann and Kelly 2011) and the 
weakness of the actors involved, especially the Government (Baccaro and Lim 2006, 
Avdagic et al. 2011). Assessments based on political exchange have also figured 
prominently in the analysis of policy concertation and social dialogue in Spain (Molina 
2005; Oliet 2005). The idea behind this perspective is that in a context of weak 
institutionalization, the resources (either financial, institutional or strictly political) 
available to actors determine their willingness to engage in tripartite social dialogue and its 
success. In a context of crisis and little room to manoeuvre, tripartite social dialogue is 
likely to continue to be under stress, as was the case in the early 1990s and is now in the 
current crises.  
2.2 Overview of the evolution of social dialogue 
over the period 2008-2012 
As mentioned earlier, two well-differentiated periods regarding tripartite social dialogue 
can be distinguished since the beginning of the financial and economic crisis. The period 
of stimulus response in 2008-2009 was characterized by a significant involvement of social 
partners, though with little results in terms of agreements signed. The 2010 debt crisis led 
to the adoption of a more unilateral approach to policymaking with less room for social 
partnership. The only exception in this regard was the January 2011 Tripartite Social and 
Economic Agreement. 
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Table 1.  Social dialogue and unilateral reforms in Spain, 2008-2012 
July 2008  Memorandum of Understanding for the 
Recovery of the Economy, 
Employment, Competitiveness and 
Social Progress 
Signed by CCOO (Comisiones Obreras), UGT 
(Unión General de Trabajadores), CEOE 
(Confederación Española de Organizaciones 
Empresariales) and the Government 
September 2009 Agreement for the public sector 
between trade unions and the 
Government 2010-2012 
Signed by CCOO, UGT, CSIF (Central Sindical 
Independiente y de Funcionarios) Confederación 
Sindical and the Government 
January 2010 Inter-confederal Agreement on 
Employment and Collective Bargaining 
2010-2012 (AENC-I) 
Bipartite agreement signed by CCOO, UGT and 
CEOE containing guidelines for collective 
agreements 
January 2010 Plan for Immediate Action 2010 There was neither consultation nor negotiations 
between the social partners and the Government. 
May 2010 
 
Austerity Plan for the Public Sector 
2011-2013 
There were neither consultations nor negotiations 
between the social partners and the Government. 
June – September 
2010 
Labour Market Reform  Tripartite negotiations failed. The Government 
ruled unilaterally. 
December 2010 Industrial Policy Programme - PIN 2020 The Government consulted social partners about 
some of the contents, but their involvement was 
limited. 
January 2011 Social and Economic Agreement on 
pensions, the labour market and 
collective bargaining 
Tripartite Social Pact signed by CCOO, UGT, 
CEOE and the Government. 
March 2011 Law for Sustainable Economy The Government consulted the social partners 
about some of the contents, but their involvement 
was limited. 
June 2011  Reform of Collective Bargaining  Tripartite negotiations failed. The Government 
ruled unilaterally. 
January 2012 Inter-confederal Agreement on 
Employment and Collective Bargaining 
(AENC-II) 
Bipartite agreement providing guidelines for 
collective agreements. 
March 2012 Labour Market Reform There was neither consultation nor negotiations 
with the social partners. Unilateral approval by the 
Government.  
The discontinuities in tripartite social dialogue contrast with the vitality and 
resilience of bipartite social dialogue. The development of bipartite social dialogue leading 
to agreements was the response of the social partners to the failure of tripartite negotiations 
in the early 1990s and early 2000s; it delivered more than 20 agreements in ten years 
(Molina and Rhodes 2011). As a matter of fact, in addition to the tripartite social pact 
signed in February 2011, two important bipartite inter-confederal agreements for collective 
bargaining have been signed, hence following the practice initiated in 2002. In addition to 
providing some general guidelines for the (re-) negotiation of collective agreements, these 
pacts also give overall indications for the development of bipartite and tripartite 
negotiations on collective bargaining and wage-setting.  
The prominent role of bipartite social dialogue has been reinforced by the emphasis 
placed by the labour market reforms of 2010 and 2011 on enhancing negotiated forms of 
adjustment and restructuring through functional flexibility. Thus the social partners’ 
strategies for mitigating the effects of the crisis on employment have focused on 
strengthening collective bargaining capacities at company level by widening the scope for 
negotiation.  
The abandonment of tripartite social dialogue as a mechanism for initiating 
economic and labour market adjustments in response to the crisis is explained very 
differently by the actors involved. One of the arguments expressed by both the employers 
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and the PSOE11 and PP12 Government is the inability of social dialogue to keep pace with 
real economic developments and to provide quick and meaningful responses.13 This was 
also highlighted by other parties in the early months of the crisis.14 However, it is also 
important to acknowledge that the paralysis in tripartite social dialogue is to a large extent 
due to the Government’s late reaction to labour market problems and its inaction in 2008 
and 2009; these had a paralysing effect on tripartite social dialogue. 
Another recurrent argument is the inefficacy of measures negotiated in the context 
of social dialogue.15 This was also brought up by some of the persons interviewed for this 
paper, referring to the fact that while the unions and the employers signed several 
agreements between the mid-1990s and 2008 on labour market and collective bargaining, 
some of these agreements had very little impact.16 The reason given for this is the nature of 
negotiated reforms which, because they reflect a compromise in the positions of the actors 
involved, are inevitably less effective.  
The Government’s limited room for manoeuvre owing to fiscal policy constraints 
has also blocked possibilities for concluding tripartite agreements. This is because the 
political give-and-take required to reach a tripartite agreement is less likely when there are 
no resources for compensating the actors for the ‘sacrifices’ they have to make. Something 
similar happened in the early 1990s, in the context of the economic crisis and adjustment 
to the Maastricht Criteria17 on inflation and budget deficits. On that occasion, tripartite 
social dialogue failed to deliver any agreement. A related argument is that there is a 
mismatch between macroeconomic governance at the EU level and governance at the 
national level.18  
Trade unions also blamed the 2009-2010 CEOE leadership as a major obstacle to 
tripartite social dialogue. Compared to previous CEOE presidents before that period, the 
CEOE leadership adopted a position less inclined to social dialogue and negotiation with 
trade unions. Moreover, its weakened position within CEOE as a result of the scandals 
swirling around some companies also blocked social dialogue and tripartite social pacts.19 
The signing of a tripartite social pact only four weeks after the election of a new CEOE 
president would support this argument. 
Finally, the legitimacy dimension of tripartite social dialogue has also come out as 
an important aspect to be considered. From the point of view of input legitimacy, criticism 
from some sectors of the population of trade unions and employers in the context of the 
crisis and austerity policies has certainly reduced the incentives for the Government to rely 
on this form of socio-economic governance. Thus in the case of the recent labour market 
reform, the ruling party expressed the view that real legitimacy comes from Parliament and 
as a consequence, there is no real obligation, nor need for additional validation of 
agreements through social dialogue.20  
                                                          
11
 Representatives of the Ministry of Labour and Immigration highlighted the resistance of trade unions to change, 
especially in austerity times.  
12
 Representative of the Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness acknowledged that the slow reform path 
imposed by social dialogue required state action in order to bring about effective and timely responses to the 
challenges posed by the economic crisis. 
13Interview with representative of the Ministry of Labour and Immigration. See also Parliamentary Debates, n. 
225, Comisión de Trabajo e Inmigración, Session n. 10, 10 March 2009, p. 15.  
14
 Parliamentary Debates, n. 59, Comisión Trabajo e Inmigración, Sesión Extraordinaria 22 July 2008, p. 35.  
15
 Parliamentary Debates, n. 128, Comisión Trabajo e Inmigración, Sesión 30 October 2008, p. 14. 
16
 Interview with representative of the Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness. 
17
 The Maastricht Criteria stipulate that the inflation rate should be no more than 1.5 per cent above the rate for the 
three EU Member States with the lowest inflation over the previous year and that the budget deficit must generally 
be below 3 per cent of GDP. 
18
 Interview with representative of UGT. 
19
 Interview with representative of UGT and representative of CCOO. 
20
 See Parliamentary Debates, n. 24, Plenary Session, 11 April 2012, p. 5. 
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As regards the EU’s supranational mandate to push for fiscal adjustment measures, 
the perception is that the Government is more accountable for its economic policies to 
supranational actors rather than to the citizens or the collective bodies representing them. 
Finally, the failure of tripartite social dialogue to deliver agreements in the early stages of 
the crisis has also had a negative effect on how it is perceived, as it contributed to the view 
that the social partners also had some responsibility for the way the crisis was managed. 
2.3 Social dialogue in the debt crisis and the 
governance of austerity 
Before entering into the detailed analysis of social dialogue during the crisis, it is important 
to note the existence of the document that provided the dialogue’s general orientation in 
content and form since 2004. This document, “the Declaration for Social Dialogue 2004: 
Competitiveness, Stable Employment and Social Cohesion”,21 was agreed soon after 
Zapatero’s first election as Prime Minister in 2004. In addition to highlighting the role of 
social dialogue in the area of competitiveness, stable employment and social cohesion, it 
specified issues for discussion in separate processes. These included labour market policy, 
training, the minimum wage, employee involvement and collective bargaining reform.22 
Subsequently, a broad and ambitious process of social dialogue was initiated and more 
than 20 agreements were signed by the tripartite partners in the succeeding years (Molina 
and Rhodes 2011). 
In view of the worrying economic and labour market conditions, the 2004 agenda 
for negotiations was widened in July 2008 through a memorandum of understanding 
(Declaración para el Impulso de la Economía, el Empleo, la Competitividad y el Progreso 
Social). Signed by the social partners and the Government, it aimed to boost employment 
and included in the agenda for social dialogue issues such as industrial and energy policy.23 
In January 2009, the social partners and the Government decided to intensify talks in order 
to speed up the process of reaching an agreement on collective bargaining in a rapidly 
worsening economic context.  
In May 2009, the social partners and the Government concluded a new meeting with 
a commitment to reach an agreement by July that year. Two types of measures would be 
negotiated as laid down in a joint UGT–CCOO document (Propuestas sindicales para un 
acuerdo por el empleo y la protección social).24 The first were short-time policies to 
alleviate the effects of the economic crisis by reducing working time without destroying 
more jobs and enhancing unemployment protection. The second were longer-term policies 
to develop a more sustainable and inclusive growth model.  
An agreement was finally not possible owing to the employers’ demand for a 
reduction of their social security contributions by 5 per cent as well as the inclusion of 
other measures on collective redundancies. Despite that failure, social dialogue delivered 
an agreement in September 2009 on the civil service and public sector employment 
(Acuerdo Gobierno-Sindicatos para la Función Pública en el Contexto del Diálogo Social 
2010-2012).25 
The perception of social dialogue as a mechanism for governing the response to the 
economic crisis and austerity policies changed quite significantly with the sovereign debt 
crisis. In a meeting in March 2009, the Socialist Government led an initiative to “relaunch 
and give momentum to social dialogue and concertation as a mechanism to generate 
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 See full text at: http://www.ugt.es/dialogosocial/declaraciondsocial.pdf 
22
 Parliamentary Debates, n.128, Comisión Trabajo e Inmigración, Sesión 30 October 2008, p. 6. 
23
 See http://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/NR/rdonlyres/1A22106D-D247-4274-AF8B-9A7390000230/90303/ 
DeclaraciondialogoSocial.pdf 
24
 See full text at: http://www.ccoo.es/comunes/recursos/1/doc14633_Propuestas_sindicales_para_un_acuerdo_ 
por_el_empleo_y_la_proteccion_social.pdf 
25
 See full text at: http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2009/10/26/pdfs/BOE-A-2009-16986.pdf 
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economic growth, trust and overcome the crisis”. This initiative was supported by the PP.26 
However, the debt crisis and external pressures on the Government to take action 
especially in regard to fiscal adjustment without waiting for the outcome of social dialogue 
led to the breakdown of negotiations on labour market reform in June 2010. The 
Government decided then to regulate matters unilaterally. 
Social dialogue was nonetheless resumed later that year and a tripartite social pact 
on pensions, the labour market and collective bargaining was signed in January 2011. 
Several reasons can be given to explain this change. An important reason was the change 
in the presidency of the employers’ organization. The involvement of the then CEOE 
president in investigations into the bankruptcy of some of his companies eroded his 
legitimacy not only within CEOE, but also with respect to trade unions and the 
Government. As a consequence, negotiations slowed down. The appointment of a new 
Labour Minister with a strong commitment to social dialogue was an additional factor in 
the resumption of social dialogue. Finally, a broader bargaining agenda favouring forms of 
exchange and compensation made it easier to reach compromises with the social partners. 
By contrast, no agreement could be finalized on the reform of collective bargaining 
in 2011. Bipartite negotiations had evolved on the basis of some of the articles in the 
January 2011 social pact, but no agreement could be reached in the end. The Government 
intervened again unilaterally. However, bipartite social dialogue remained alive and 
delivered a new and important inter-confederal agreement in January 2012. By signing this 
agreement in a difficult social and economic context, employers and trade unions made 
clear their commitment to social dialogue and sent a signal to the incoming right-wing 
Government about its importance and the capacity and responsibility of social partners for 
negotiating reforms autonomously.27 
In spite of the January 2012 bipartite Agreement on Employment and Collective 
Bargaining, tripartite social dialogue was faced with great challenges in 2012. The 
announcement of a labour market reform which did not involve the social partners in a 
dialogue, the general strike in May 2012 and the acceleration of fiscal adjustment in the 
face of the deterioration of Spain’s macroeconomic prospects impinged heavily on social 
dialogue. As a result, the trade unions rejected any social dialogue with the current 
Government and declared that they would enter into negotiations only after a referendum 
on austerity policies had been called.28  
2.4 Economic and industrial policy in austerity 
times: The role of social dialogue 
The Budget for 2010 marked a turning point as it was primarily based on revenue-
increasing measures with the objectives of protecting core social spending and shielding 
welfare beneficiaries from the effects of the downturn. For the first time the Socialist 
Government showed that it had become well aware of the structural character of the crisis. 
In addition to preparing a plan for fiscal consolidation, it presented in February 2010 a 
roadmap for changing the country’s production model (Azpitarte Sánchez 2011). The most 
important contents of the plan were the Law for Sustainable Economy, a roadmap for fiscal 
consolidation and a scheme for the development of a process of social dialogue on 
reforming the labour market and the pension system. 
The Law for Sustainable Economy29 (Law 2/2011) approved in March 2011 was 
preceded by talks with social partners, political parties and other actors in the economic 
and civil spheres. This law constituted an ambitious plan to achieve more sustainable 
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 See Parliamentary Debates, n. 225, Comisión de Trabajo e Inmigración, 10th March 2009, pp. 22-26.  
27
 The strong commitment of employers to social dialogue is made very clear by Mrs. Ana Herraez who stresses 
that dialogue is part of the “DNA” of CEOE.  
28
 See http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2012/09/19/economia/1348047099.html 
29
 See full text at: http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2011/03/05/pdfs/BOE-A-2011-4117.pdf 
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growth through changes in the regulation of product and factor markets, the education 
system, competition law, etc. Its final aim was to gradually move from an extensive growth 
model based on the expansion of employment to a more sustainable intensive model based 
on high value-added activities and productivity increases (DGAMEI 2011). However, the 
lack of resources has severely curtailed its impacty and has led to the abandonment of 
many of its aspects. (Morán Criado 2010). 
In addition to the Law for Sustainable Economy, the Government announced a plan 
for fiscal adjustment in the expectation that economic recovery would happen soon. 
Anticipating positive economic growth by the end of 2010, the Government decided that, 
in order not to jeopardize the recovery, the time was right for the implementation of 
austerity measures.30  
In the context of growing uncertainty about Greece’s capacity to meet its borrowing 
requirements in early 2010, the Spanish Government announced the Plan de Acción 
Inmediata 2010 (Plan for Immediate Action 2010) and the Plan de Austeridad 2011-201331 
(Austerity Plan 2011-2013). The Government was aware that the increased public 
investment in the previous months, together with high and increasing unemployment, 
exerted strong pressures on public accounts and that gradual stabilization measures were 
required.  
The Plan for Immediate Action 2010 implied a further 0.5 per cent reduction in the 
GDP deficit from the level already provided for by the Budget Law and imposed a ban on 
new contracts in the public sector. The Austerity Plan 2011-2013 envisaged additional cuts 
in the expenditure authorized by the Budget Law for all items with the exception of 
pensions, unemployment protection, research and development, and education. It also 
provided for cuts in the wages of public sector employees (5 per cent in 2010) and a wage 
freeze for 2011, a freeze on pensions in 2011, a significant drop in housing investment and 
the abolition of the so-called cheque bebé among others. 
The Plan for Immediate Action 2010, the first austerity package, was passed in May 
2010 without any consultation or negotiation with social partners. The Plan was announced 
by then Prime Minister Zapatero in the middle of negotiations for a reform of collective 
bargaining. The announcement had a negative impact on the evolution of social dialogue. 
A general strike in the public sector was called in June 2010 and negotiations on the 
reform of collective bargaining and the labour market broke down some weeks later 
without agreement. The trade unions criticized the Plan heavily and bemoaned the fact that 
they were not given prior notice of its passage. On May 12, Prime Minister Zapatero 
announced a policy package that includes major cuts in social protection as well as the 
earning of public sector employees; this marked the beginning of a new period for social 
dialogue characterized by rising tension and increasing obstacles to tripartite social 
dialogue.  
The economic policy followed by the right-wing Government elected in November 
2011 has been characterized by a strong commitment to austerity, hence continuing the 
path initiated some months before. This has resulted in the adoption of a more negative 
stance on tripartite social dialogue.  
Industrial policy  
As will be discussed later in greater detail, plans to reduce the deficit contain some 
elements that shape the economy and the country’s production model. However, there have 
been specific policies aimed at introducing structural changes in the economy. Regarding 
industrial policy, the strategy of the 2008-2011 Socialist Government in its early stages 
consisted in stimulating the car industry which plays a key role in the Spanish 
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 See Intervention by Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, Parliamentary Debates, n. 140, Plenary 
Session, 10 February 2010, p. 6. 
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 See full text at: http://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/ConsejodeMinistros/Referencias/_2010/refc20100129.htm 
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manufacturing sector. This was mostly made by providing incentives to attract the 
development and construction of new car models in Spain. A total of 3 100 million euro 
were devoted to this goal in 2009.  
Some months later the Government shifted strategy and adopted a more ambitious 
plan for a change in the production model towards greater sustainability and value added. 
The Plan Integral de Política Industrial 2010-2020 (Industrial Policy Programme - PIN 
2020) under the umbrella of the strategy for sustainable economy envisaged the 
development of strategic sectors like information and communications (ICT) technology, 
biotechnology, renewable energy and the aerospace industry.32 The Government developed 
this approach in dialogue with the country’s political parties and social partners.  
Among the objectives of PIN 2020 were to raise from 15 per cent to 18 per cent the 
share of manufacturing in GDP by 2015 and the modernization of the industry (Legarda 
and Hidalgo 2011). The main obstacle to achieving these goals was the limited access to 
credit by companies. Because of the problems of the banking system, companies, and 
especially SMEs, have found it difficult to obtain the resources necessary to invest in new 
equipment or to start a new business.  
Tripartite social dialogue on economic and industrial policy lost momentum with the 
onset of the sovereign debt crisis. The social partners were significantly involved in the 
drafting of aspects of the Law for Sustainable Economy during 2009-2010. However, the 
new scenario characterized by severe fiscal adjustment and a focus on spending cuts rather 
than expansionary policies has reduced the scope for tripartism.  
2.5 Labour market reforms in austerity times:  
The role of social dialogue and collective 
bargaining 
The economic crisis led to the introduction of important changes in labour market 
regulation and employment policy in 2010, 2011 and 2012. The regulatory mechanism 
chosen to cope with the impact of the economic crisis on the labour market was initially 
collective bargaining. An attempt was made by the social partners with the support of the 
Government to enhance internal flexibility and allow negotiated adaptation and 
restructuring measures via collective agreements. The 2010 Bipartite Agreement on 
Employment and Collective Bargaining 2010-2012 outlines the key aspects of this 
strategy.33 However, as labour market problems persisted without the social partners 
reaching consensus on how to reform collective bargaining, the Government decided to act 
unilaterally to change labour market regulation and the collective bargaining system but 
maintained the overall goal of enhancing internal flexibility. In 2012 a reorientation of the 
strategy and objectives of labour market regulation took place with a labour market reform 
that changed firing and hiring regulations while at the same time regulating aspects of 
collective bargaining to enhance adaptability. 
The policy objective driving reforms, given the structural problems of the Spanish 
economy, was the maintenance of employment levels in a situation of unprecedented rates 
of job destruction. Employment creation was never the underlying goal of reforms. Some 
reforms targeted specific groups like the youth and women.34  
The duality that characterizes the Spanish labour market, with a large percentage of 
employees on fixed-term contracts, has been identified by all actors involved in social 
dialogue as one of the key problems to tackle through regulatory reforms. The approach 
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 See full text at: http://www.minetur.gob.es/es-es/gabineteprensa/notasprensa/documents/ 
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 See full text at: http://www.empleo.gob.es/es/Guia/pdfs/pdfsnuev/RES110210.pdf 
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 This has been the case of the 2012 Reform. Interview with representative of the Ministry of Employment and 
Social Security and representative of the Ministry of Employment and Social Security. 
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adopted before the start of the crisis to deal with this issue was to provide incentives for 
hiring staff on an open-ended basis and for converting temporary contracts into open-
ended contracts by reducing the employers’ social security contributions. 
In this regard, there seems to be a generalised consensus around the inefficacy of 
this strategy as showed by the little success of previous reforms in bringing down the rate 
of temporary employment.35 As a consequence, there has been strong pressure on the 
2008-2011 Socialist Government to shift to a different strategy seeking to reduce the gap 
between dismissal costs under temporary and open-ended contracts. In view of the already 
low costs of dismissing temporary employees, this has translated into strong pressures to 
reduce dismissal costs for open-ended contracts.36 Even though the 2009 and 2010 reforms 
already advanced somewhat in this direction, the definitive push for the approach came 
with the 2012 reform. 
All labour market reforms approved during the crisis were passed by the Spanish 
Government without an agreement with the social partners. It should be noted that while 
the 2010 and 2011 reforms were preceded by negotiations between the social partners and 
the Socialist Government, no form of social dialogue took place on the 2012 reform.  
There are significant differences in the orientation and policy objectives of the 
various reforms. The 2010 and 2011 reforms passed under the PSOE Government aimed at 
enhancing internal or functional flexibility, though there were also measures to reduce 
dismissal costs. Even though the 2012 reform contains some important provisions to 
promote functional flexibility, it seems to have moved back to a preference for external or 
numerical flexibility (emphasis on the use of temporary workers and part-timers in the 
employed workforce).37 Moreover, it has deviated from the previous dominant approach in 
so far as it has focused on facilitating exit from the labour market rather than entry into it.  
In the early months of the economic crisis, the emphasis was on strengthening the 
efficacy and resources of the Public Employment Service (SEPE, Servicio de Empleo 
Público Estatal). In a context of rapidly increasing unemployment, the Socialist Party made 
an effort to develop a more individualized public system of intermediation and career 
guidance.38 However, as the Minister pointed out in 2008, it was difficult to achieve 
coordination in this area because the management of the labour market was carried out at 
both the national and the regional level. For instance, the national government had 
responsibility for passive labour market or income replacement policies,39 while the 
regions oversaw active labour market policies (i.e. policies aimed at bringing the 
unemployed to work). One of the interviewees for this paper criticized the management of 
employment policies in the early stages of the crisis when too much emphasis was placed 
on employment policies at the regional level with little coordination at the national level.40 
The 2010 Reform (Royal Decree Law 35/2010,  
17 September 2010) 
The 2010 reform was passed when Spain’s labour market situation had deteriorated 
significantly in comparison to those of other EU countries, reaching an unemployment rate 
of 20 per cent. The mechanisms that allowed other countries, including Germany and Italy, 
to improve their labour market performance constituted the model for the reform. 
Accordingly, the main goal was to safeguard existing employment levels, or at least to halt 
the rapid process of job destruction.  
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The Government announced in January 2010 its intention to push for an ambitious 
agenda of structural reforms, also covering the labour market, in order to reduce the deficit 
as well as to set the foundations for economic recovery and growth. Particularly important 
in this regard was the change in attitude towards the role of labour market reform. The 
Government had maintained until then a clear position arguing that a reform of the labour 
market would not contribute to the creation of employment and stimulate growth as the 
crisis had nothing to do with labour market regulation.41 While the trade unions endorsed 
the government view, employer organizations supported changes in labour law regulation 
aimed at easing firing regulations as the only way to halt unemployment growth. 
Negotiations started formally in February 2010, on the basis of the 2010 bipartite 
Agreement on Employment and Collective Bargaining, which provided some guidelines 
for the development of social dialogue among the social partners with a particular focus on 
collective bargaining and the development of functional flexibility. In April 2010 the 
Government issued a document presenting the main points of agreement in the social 
dialogue on labour market regulation (Diálogo Social sobre Actuaciones en el Mercado de 
Trabajo).42 According to this document, negotiations among social partners and the 
Government had to focus on five issues: labour market segmentation, a review of financial 
incentives for hiring workers, labour market intermediation services, youth employment 
programme and the extension of short-time working schemes. The Government, trade 
unions and employer organizations agreed that the duality of the labour market was its 
main problem and therefore the target of reforms.43 
The development of social dialogue was certainly conditioned by the announcement 
of the first austerity package some days later, on 12 May. Although the Government had 
reassured the social partners of its strong commitment to social dialogue and promised that 
no reform would be passed without their agreement, the radical shift in Zapatero’s 
economic and fiscal policy had a negative effect on the negotiations on the reform of the 
labour market. The significant differences in the stances of the unions and the employers in 
regard to the employers’ demand for an expansion of the grounds for fair dismissal further 
weakened the impetus to reach a negotiated agreement. Finally, the weak position of the 
CEOE president, discussed earlier in this paper, also hampered the deliberations.44  
The negotiations failed definitively on 6 June 2010 and the Government sent the 
trade unions and employer organizations a few days later a draft document proposing 
measures for the reform of the labour market. Its main points were more stringent rules on 
fixed-term contracts; a relaxation of the causes for fair dismissal; promotion of open-ended 
contracts; and mechanisms to facilitate the use of short-term working schemes.  
In response to the unilateral approval of the labour market reform, trade unions 
called for a general strike on 29 September. The trade unions denounced the reduction in 
dismissal costs and the fact that the reform was passed unilaterally. This came after the 
strike of public sector employees on 8 June as a response to the wage cuts approved in the 
12 May austerity package.  
The 2011 Economic and Social Agreement for Growth, 
Employment and the Sustainability of Pensions45 
(Royal Decree Law 1/2011, 1 February) 
Negotiations between the social partners and the Government on the reform of old age 
pensions were soon widened by October 2010 to cover other issues such as collective 
bargaining, employment policy and labour market regulation. After a general strike in 
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September 2010 and repeated failures to reach an agreement, both trade unions and 
employer organizations considered it urgent to restore social dialogue and deliver 
agreements. They realized that after three years of economic slowdown and no broad 
consensus reached so far on mechanisms for exiting the crisis, their role was being 
questioned by the population. As a trade union official pointed out: “If social dialogue does 
not deliver agreements, it will weaken.” There was accordingly a lot of pressure to sign an 
agreement, but the context was not particularly favourable.46  
The trade unions were very much in favour of a comprehensive pact covering the 
labour market, collective bargaining and old age pensions. This was supported by the 
Government after its relations with the unions deteriorated as a consequence of the labour 
market reform and the general strike in September 2010. The change in the CEOE 
presidency provided an additional incentive to favour a process of social dialogue as the 
new president adopted a more favourable approach to the negotiations.  
Finally, a tripartite social pact (the Economic and Social Agreement for Growth, 
Employment and the Sustainability of Pensions) was signed in February 2011. This 
comprehensive pact covered old age pensions, youth unemployment, active labour market 
policies, the reform of collective bargaining, R&D, and industrial and energy policy.  
Regarding labour market regulation and employment policy, the pact made 
commitments in three main areas.47 the efficacy of active labour market policies; the 
transition to stable employment; and coordination between the national, regional and local 
government levels, the lack of which was an obstacle to the effectiveness of employment 
policies. The pact also committed itself to implementing some of the elements of the 2010 
reform which had not been carried out so far.48  
The most controversial aspect of the pact was the reform of old age pensions. It 
raised the pensionable age from 65 to 67 years, a measure that was heavily contested by 
large factions among the trade unions. Even though the pact had some elements of 
flexibility, making it possible for employees to be entitled to full pension without having 
reached 67 years of age, the criticisms highlighted the fact that in a labour market like the 
Spanish one, with high rates of temporary employment and frequent unemployment spells, 
it would be difficult to reach maximum pension levels.  
Even though it is difficult to assess the effectiveness of the reforms because of the 
rapidly changing economic environment, some interviewees agreed that the 2010 
agreement had a limited impact.49 In addition to the negative economic context, one reason 
was the Socialist Government fear of facing strong opposition from the trade unions. This 
led to its unilateral approval of an extremely cautious reform plan which had no actual or 
very limited impact on shaping labour market developments. A similar diagnosis is made 
of the labour market measures of the 2011 Social and Economic Agreement. The 
piecemeal and fragmented character of these measures has severely limited their 
effectiveness (CES 2012: 406). 
The 2012 Labour Market Reform  
(Royal Decree Law 3/2012, 10 February 2012) 
The positions of the trade unions and employers on labour market regulation became 
increasingly discordant during 2011 as the employers openly stated that their top priority 
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was the facilitation of dismissals.50 The divisions widened over the reform of collective 
bargaining, as the failure to sign an agreement and unilateral regulation by the Government 
in June 2011 made clear. Moreover, the weakening of the Socialist Government and its 
expected defeat in the forthcoming November 2011 elections gave employers incentives to 
delay social dialogue as much as possible in anticipation of the entry of a new right-wing 
Government.  
Despite the disagreements, bipartite social dialogue continued between the trade 
unions and employers. By January 2012 a new bipartite Inter-confederal Agreement on 
Employment and Collective Bargaining 2012-2014 (AENC II) was signed. Its objective 
was to provide the Government with a document setting out the consensus between unions 
and employers on issues ranging from active labour market policies to the structure of 
collective bargaining.  
The right-wing Government elected in November 2011 soon made clear its intention 
to reform the labour market. Even though the Government and some representatives of the 
labour ministry engaged in separate talks with the trade unions and employer organizations 
right after their appointment, there was no attempt to enter into a tripartite social dialogue. 
In fact, the Government did not take into account some of the contents of the 2012 inter-
confederal agreement when it drafted the law proposal. The then recently appointed 
Labour Minister Mrs. Fátima Báñez said that while the Government had full respect for 
social dialogue, the outcome of the social dialogue among trade unions and employers set 
out in the January 2012 agreement was clearly insufficient to tackle the problems of the 
Spanish labour market.51  
The trade unions and the opposition party PSOE criticized the reform process that 
led to 2012 Labour Market Reform. In the words of Mr. Celestino Corbacho, it marked a 
major discontinuity in Spain’s employment relations which had in the past been 
characterized by social dialogue and the search for consensus.52 According to the trade 
unions, the Government deviated from a long-standing tradition of holding consultations 
and negotiations before formulating labour market reforms. It had failed to initiate a 
process of dialogue with social partners and to circulate a draft of the reform proposal.  
The most important innovations of the 2012 labour market reform law can be 
summarized as follows: new limitations to the extension of the terms of collective 
agreements when they have expired (the extension is referred to as ultra-actividad); easier 
conditions for opting out from higher level agreements; the addition of measures subject to 
non-application by employers; widening of the causes for fair dismissal, including an 
enterprise’s fall in earnings for a period of nine consecutive months; reduction of 
severance payment in cases of unfair dismissal under open-ended contracts; new forms of 
measuring and monitoring absenteeism as a motivation for ending employment 
relationships; incentives for expanding teleworking; and creation of a new open-ended 
contract to promote entrepreneurship with a one-year trial period.  
In response, the trade unions called for mobilizations, including a general strike in 
March 2012. As had happened in 1994, they also announced their intention to offset some 
of the contents of the reform via collective agreements.  
Even though the employers were positive about the reform, they criticized its 
softness and ambiguity on issues like the new contract for the promotion of 
entrepreneurship.53 In addition, they argued that part-time employment had to be given 
greater flexibility for it to reach its full potential. Finally, they questioned the 
Government’s reluctance to use the 2012 bipartite agreement on employment as the 
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starting point for the negotiation of the labour market reform. Whilst employers regarded 
the inter-confederal agreement as fully valid and as a good starting point for future 
negotiations, the trade unions expressed the view that the Government had delegitimized 
the agreement by overlooking it when it drafted the reform law of 2012.54 It is therefore 
very likely that the reform law will impinge negatively on tripartite social dialogue. In a 
recent statement, the trade unions said that they considered it impossible to restore 
tripartite social dialogue unless the Government changed its economic policy programme 
and called for a referendum. 
2.6 The reform of collective bargaining in 
austerity times: The role of social dialogue 
One of the most important outcomes of social dialogue during the crisis has been an 
increasing awareness of the need to enhance the capacity of collective agreements to adapt 
to changing conditions through the use of internal numerical or functional flexibility 
(working time flexibility, reorganization of jobs and functions). The use of short-time 
working schemes through collective agreements has accordingly been a priority in the 
reform process. The final aim is to compensate for the over-reliance of the Spanish labour 
market on external numerical flexibility (intake from the external labour market). Even 
though there have been some significant advances in this regard, there remains the 
structural problem posed by the small size of Spanish companies which severely reduces 
the possibility for relying on functional flexibility (movement of employees to different 
activities or tasks within companies) as an adjustment mechanism. 
Wage settlements during the crisis have been moderate and losses in real wages have 
happened and are expected to happen in the coming months.55 Additional changes have 
been introduced in labour law and the regulation of collective bargaining in order to 
guarantee and facilitate partial access to unemployment benefits. The effort of the social 
partners as well as the Government has been particularly important in this regard.  
The trend towards the decentralization of collective bargaining has accelerated 
during the crisis. Before the 2012 reform, all collective bargaining reforms contained 
mechanisms for organized decentralization, with higher-level collective agreements 
establishing the criteria for lower-level agreements. The defence of a multi-level 
bargaining system where sectoral collective agreements monitor the process of 
decentralization was a strategy shared by the trade unions and employer organizations to 
deal with the risks posed by decentralization, as was shown in the 1997 peak inter-
confederal agreement on collective bargaining. However, the 2012 reform has meant a 
break from previous practice as it not only enhances the regulatory capacity of company-
level agreements, but also gives more regulatory power to employers while reducing the 
regulatory capacity of sectoral agreements.  
Additionally, procedural changes were introduced in the regulation of collective 
bargaining in order to facilitate and speed up the renewal of existing agreements. These 
included changes in collective dispute resolution mechanisms. Even though the social 
partners have defended their autonomy in reforming collective bargaining, most of the 
changes were introduced by the Government without entering into a previous agreement 
with them. It could therefore be argued that the crisis has reinforced the statist character of 
industrial relations in Spain.  
Inter-Confederal Agreement on Employment and 
Collective Bargaining 2010-2012  
The reform of collective bargaining has been one of the most debated issues since the 
beginning of the crisis. The main problems attached to it were related first of all to the 
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excessive rigidity it imposed on wage setting. It has been argued that the existing structure 
of collective bargaining, one, delivered high wage increases because of its intermediate 
level of (de-)centralization and, two, limited the possibilities for a flexible adjustment of 
wages to a new environment. Some political parties and employers have also pointed out 
that the automatic extension of the terms of an agreement when negotiations on its renewal 
have failed (the so-called ultra-actividad) imposed excessive rigidities that are particularly 
harmful in times of crisis. 
Because of its importance, bipartite social dialogue on the reform of collective 
bargaining has been going on for a long time. However, the crisis made clear the 
significant differences existing between unions and employers on the problems affecting 
collective bargaining and their solution. This became evident with the failure of 
negotiations to reach agreement on the renewal of the 2008 AINC to set guidelines for 
collective bargaining in 2009.56  
The trade unions and employers signed in November 2009 a document to unblock 
the negotiation of several collective agreements (Compromiso de Actuación entre CEOE y 
CEPYME, y CCOO y UGT, sobre la Negociación Colectiva pendiente de 2009).57 
Bipartite social dialogue was resumed and in January 2010 the peak organizations signed 
the 2010 bipartite Inter-confederal Agreement for Employment and Collective Bargaining 
2010-2012 (AENC-I).58 This Agreement, which continued the series of peak inter-
confederal agreements initiated in 2002, dealt with several aspects including the 
transformation of temporary contracts into open-ended contracts, internal flexibility, 
teleworking, guidelines for wage developments (2010: 1 per cent; 2011: 1-2 per cent; 
2012: 1.5-2.5 per cent), the use of opting-out clauses and the beginning of negotiations on 
the reform of collective bargaining. 
In accordance with the commitment expressed in AENC I, negotiations were carried 
out on a reform of collective bargaining, but these did not deliver an agreement in 2010. 
However, the Labour Market Reform Law approved in September that year (Law 35/2010, 
17 September) contained some important implications for collective bargaining. More 
specifically, the Reform Law enhanced the possibility for arriving at negotiated solutions 
(involving functional flexibility, working time reductions, etc.) without necessarily 
resorting to numerical external flexibility, i.e., lay-offs. In effect, the Reform Law enlarged 
the capacity of collective agreements at the company level to introduce internal flexibility 
by favouring greater adaptability to economic circumstances and widened the scope for the 
non-application of higher-level agreements on wages and other working conditions at 
company level. 
The 2011 Reform of Collective Bargaining 
After the September 2010 general strike against the Labour Market Reform Law, the social 
partners resumed bipartite negotiations some months later on the basis of the 2011 
tripartite Social and Economic Agreement. More specifically, the negotiations were based 
on a document (Acuerdo sobre criterios básicos para la reforma de la negociación 
colectiva) contained in the Agreement which provided the starting point for the negotiation 
of a reform of collective bargaining.59 After four months of bipartite talks between the 
unions and employers, only limited consensus was possible and no pact was signed. The 
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Government had urged social partners to reach an agreement and decided to regulate 
unilaterally on the issue by approving a Royal Decree Law on Urgent Measures to Reform 
Collective Bargaining in June 2011.60 Even though the Royal Decree reflected the limited 
consensus reached by the trade unions and employers, the social partners considered it a 
violation of their collective autonomy.61  
The Royal Decree Law introduced changes in the structure of collective bargaining 
by establishing a series of issues for which negotiation at company level had priority. It 
also modified the procedures and timing for rejecting and renegotiating collective 
agreements in order to avoid an escalation of conflict and speed up the process.  
The 2012 Inter-Confederal Agreement on Employment 
and Collective Bargaining (AENC 2012-2014) 
Bipartite negotiations on the reform of collective bargaining resumed in the last weeks of 
2011. Some of the principles that had to orient this reform were contained in the 2012 
bipartite Inter-confederal Agreement on Employment and Collective Bargaining 2012-
2014 (AENC-II).62 This Agreement has to be interpreted as a continuation of the one 
signed in 2010, though the signatory parties acknowledge that changes have happened in 
the international context and that these changes have an impact on Spain’s economic 
growth and its labour market. Interestingly, the Agreement starts with an alert on the loss 
of competitiveness of the Spanish economy as a result of high nominal wage increases. It 
then asks for an incomes policy pact that would help to bring the wage evolution into line 
with productivity and Eurozone inflation. 
The underlying objective of the bipartite Agreement was to bring changes in 
collective bargaining and the labour market back into the autonomous sphere of 
negotiations between trade unions and employer organizations. Failed attempts at reaching 
an agreement and the Government’s unilateral regulation in 2011 forced the social partners 
to agree on the direction collective bargaining had to move and impede further attempts at 
unilateral intervention. 
The most important and innovative aspect of AENC II in relation to AENC I, passed 
in 2010, is the explicit demand for the decentralization of collective bargaining within the 
framework provided by sector-level agreements. Sector-level agreements must provide the 
rules for coordination and articulation amongst different levels in the collective bargaining 
structure while enhancing the role played by company-level agreements. Moreover, the 
Agreement obliges collective agreements to include plans to develop internal flexibility by 
clearly distinguishing between its three elements: wages, working time and functions. It 
constitutes another step in the attempt to enhance internal flexibility with a view to 
safeguarding jobs in the short term, but with a longer-term objective of changing the 
mechanisms for adjusting the labour market and move from external (numerical) to 
internal (functional) flexibility.  
Moreover, AENC II takes into account the worsening economic situation by 
correcting some of the conditions agreed in AENC I, including the conditions applicable to 
negotiated wages. Finally, AENC II further opens the door to opting out from higher-level 
agreements by means of company-level agreements on issues other than wages. This 
applies in particular to aspects related to internal flexibility where the non-implementation 
at company level of the terms agreed in higher-level agreements is facilitated under certain 
conditions and following rules arising from consultations with workers’ representatives.  
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The 2012 Reform of the Labour Market: 
implications for collective bargaining 
Notwithstanding the successful attempt of the trade unions and employers to bring back the 
reform of collective bargaining into the purview of autonomous negotiations through 
AENC II, the Government regulated again unilaterally on the matter some weeks later 
without resuming talks with the social partners. In imposing the 2012 Reform Law, the 
Government overlooked all the significant innovations and guidelines for developing 
internal flexibility through collective bargaining that were provided for in AENC II. This 
astonished not only the trade unions63 but also the employers who did not understand the 
Government’s reasons for ignoring AENC-II.64 
The 2012 Reform Law introduced important modifications to certain areas covered 
by collective bargaining. Specifically, the Reform opens the door to unilateral changes by 
the employer of working conditions including wages and reduces the period for notifying 
the employee of such changes. Similarly, the employer has also been given more capacity 
to decide unilaterally on issues related to collective redundancies.  
The Law also empowers the employer to regulate working conditions through the 
temporary non-application of collective agreements on a number of issues and significantly 
relaxes the conditions under which this can happen. For instance, the employer can 
suspend the application of collective agreements when the company registers falling 
earnings during nine consecutive months.  
One of the most contested characteristics of collective bargaining in Spain, the so-
called ultra-actividad of collective agreements (the extension of the validity of a collective 
agreement after its expiration when trade unions and employers fail to sign a new 
agreement) has been changed by the establishment of a two-year limit for the negotiation 
of a new agreement. If no agreement is signed at the end of this period, workers will be 
covered by a higher-level agreement and, in the absence of such an agreement, by the 
terms established by law. 
Finally, the 2012 Reform Law regulates the very important issue of collective 
bargaining. It not only confirms the priority given to company-level agreements, but also 
makes it impossible for higher-level agreements to carry clauses establishing their 
precedence over lower-level agreements. In other words, the reform reduces the regulatory 
and governance capacity of sectoral agreements over the collective bargaining system.  
The trade unions condemned most of the contents of the Reform Law as it deviates 
from what had been agreed under the bipartite 2012 Inter-confederal Agreement only some 
weeks before.65 They also criticized the absence of any attempt to engage in social 
dialogue in the drafting of the reform proposal. The employers also censured the Law 
because of their opposition to complete decentralization. The trade unions and the 
employers thus agree on the need to maintain sectoral agreements, but they differ in their 
views about the degree of flexibility to be accorded to company-level agreements as well 
as about the most adequate mechanism for attaining that flexibility.66  
By far, the most important impact of the 2012 Reform Law has been on tripartite 
social dialogue, which has not been restored since the Law was passed. 
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3. Impact of the adjustment on industrial 
relations and social dialogue 
The impact of austerity measures on industrial relations and social dialogue has consisted 
first of all in a crisis of tripartite social dialogue and an increase in political and industrial 
conflict. The imposition of austerity policies has led to several general or political67 strikes 
affecting both the private and public sectors of the economy (table 2). More specifically, 
there have been three general strikes and one strike of public-sector employees. In 
addition, there have been general strikes in specific sectors such as education and health. 
The rise in the number of general strikes of a political nature and in working hours lost 
contrast with the gradual decline observed in industrial conflict (see figure 6).  
Table 2.  General strikes in Spain, 2010-2012 
Date Scope Motivation Participants 
June 2010 Public sector Against the May 2010 
austerity package 
CCOO + UGT + CSIF 
September 2010 All the economy Against the labour market 
reform and austerity 
package 
All trade unions 
January 2011 All the economy Against the Social and 
Economic Agreement and 
pension reform 
All trade unions except 
CCOO and UGT, the two 
largest confederations, 
which had signed the 
Agreement 
March 2012 All the economy Against the Labour Market 
Reform Law passed in 
February 2012 
All trade unions 
The trade unions and employer organizations have expressed their concerns about 
the negative effects of the 2012 Reform Law on the development of collective bargaining. 
As has been mentioned earlier, the Law, unilaterally passed by the Government, ignored 
the bipartite Inter-confederal Agreement of January 2012 and its specific guidelines for the 
development of negotiations. The social partners believe that the Law has radically 
modified the scenario for the negotiation of collective agreements.68 The trade unions have 
already signified their intention to block the implementation of some of the Law’s 
provisions through collective agreements. While the employers have not made their 
position clear on this point, it is likely that the renewal of collective agreements in the near 
future will be characterized by mounting conflict. 
As has been made clear in the discussions in section II, there is a sharp contrast 
between developments in tripartite and bipartite negotiations. While austerity policies have 
brought tripartite bargaining to a crisis as a result of a lack of consensus on some critical 
aspects and, more recently, by the abandonment of negotiations by the Government, 
bipartite social dialogue continues to play an important role as demonstrated by the 
Agreements for Employment and Collective Bargaining signed in 2010 and 2012. 
However, the vitality of bipartite social dialogue has not impeded an attack on the 
collective autonomy of the social partners, as evidenced by the repeated passage by the 
Government of unilateral regulations on collective bargaining. The autonomy of social 
partners has also been threatened as a consequence of austerity policies.  
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Figure 6.  Number of working days lost (excluding general strikes), 1986-2011 
 
Source: Boletín de Estadísticas Laborales 
First of all, the 2011 Reform of Collective Bargaining, imposed unilaterally by the 
Government, has meant that collective bargaining, hitherto falling under the direct 
competence of trade unions and employer organizations, is now subject to unilateral State 
regulation. Collective bargaining rights have also been severely curtailed by the 2012 
Labour Reform Law. For instance, the greater scope opened up for employers to make 
unilateral decisions and to temporarily suspend the application of collective agreements 
constitute a major retrenchment in the exercise of collective rights. Finally, the abolition of 
ultra-actividad (the automatic extension of the terms of a collective agreement when it 
expires) and the development of mechanisms for compulsory arbitration have also moved 
in this direction and will give the Law a more important role in determining working 
conditions.  
Moreover, the enlargement of the employers’ decision-making authority has to be 
considered in the context of a long-running trend towards increasing decentralization of 
collective bargaining. This decentralization has been mostly organized around a clear 
division of tasks between sectoral and company-level agreements. But the most important 
change introduced in the context of the crisis has been the extension of clauses enabling 
company-level agreements to opt out from certain provisions of collective agreements. 
This extension has led to an increase in the number of issues that can be subject to opting 
out and an expansion of the circumstances under which opting out can occur. As has 
already been mentioned, the argument shared by the social partners and the Government is 
the need to enhance the role of collective bargaining as a tool for internal flexibility. 
One of the most visible impacts of the structural adjustment on collective bargaining 
has been the difficulties experienced in renewing collective agreements. This has been 
raised by many of the persons interviewed and has been directly linked to the economic 
crisis and the expectation of regulatory changes in collective bargaining.69  
As figure 7 shows, there has been a sudden fall over the period 2009 to 2011 in the 
number of agreements signed or renewed. Economic crises certainly affect negotiating 
                                                          
69
 Interview with representative of the National Advisory Council for Collective Agreemetns and representative of 
CEOE, and representative of the Ministry of Labour and Immigration. 
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dynamics and further evidence is found in the drop in the number of agreements in the 
early 1990s in the context of another economic crisis. However, the size of the recent fall 
is remarkably higher, reflecting the large number of collective agreements that have 
expired but have not been renewed.  
One of the main reasons for this fall is the expectation of further changes in the 
regulation of collective agreements, pushing employers to use delaying tactics so that they 
can negotiate agreements under a more favourable regulatory framework. Particularly 
important to the employers are changes in ultra-actividad (the automatic extension of the 
validity of collective agreements) to allow agreements to expire. Ultra-actividad has made 
collective bargaining somewhat rigid as wage increases, for example, negotiated in 
previous years to meet a certain set of conditions have to be maintained even when these 
conditions have changed drastically. However, ultra-actividad has guaranteed employees 
better working conditions when negotiations amongst workers’ representatives and 
employers failed to reach an agreement. Finally, the resistance of trade unions to a 
downgrading of the terms of a previous agreement could also help to explain this 
phenomenon. 
Figure 7.  Number of agreements signed (including renewal), 1981-2011 
 
Source: Boletin de Estadísticas Laborales. 
4.  Concluding remarks and possible ways 
for a revitalization of social dialogue 
Tripartite social dialogue in Spain is currently under stress after several years of producing 
significant outcomes as a central piece of Spain’s democratic system. Since the early 
stages of the transition to democracy, it has been a key element of socio-economic 
governance and a distinctive feature of industrial relations in Spain. In spite of some 
difficult moments, it continued playing a central role in managing the labour market and 
social protection in the years preceding the current economic crisis. In the middle of the 
debt crisis and despite the Government’s austerity policies, it delivered a comprehensive 
social pact in 2011, showing that it retained its ability to obtain a consensus on structural 
reforms even at difficult junctures. 
One of the strategic responses of the social partners to the instability of tripartite 
social dialogue was to strengthen and develop bipartite social dialogue at the highest 
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levels. This happened in the early 1990s, after the failed attempts to negotiate a tripartite 
social pact to face the economic crisis and the run-up to the European Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU) (Molina and Rhodes 2011). The state-dependent character of 
industrial relations and the highly contingent character of tripartite social dialogue due to 
economic and political circumstances, led the social partners to strengthen bipartite social 
dialogue. The latter proved to be aneffective tool in leading the adjustment of collective 
bargaining within the new EMU framework and constraints.  
Recent developments seem to confirm the gap between tripartite and bipartite social 
dialogue. Not only is there some evident functional differentiation between these two 
processes in regard to the issues they deal with, but also they have followed opposite 
trends. Its very nature makes tripartite social dialogue right for negotiating social security 
issues and, more generally, industrial, environmental and macroeconomic policies. By 
contrast, bipartite social dialogue is more suitable for matters related to employment 
policy, labour market regulation, industrial relations, training. Whilst tripartite social 
dialogue is to a large extent subject to the political will of the Government (Hamman and 
Kelly 2011) and hence more uncertain, bipartite social dialogue has proved to be more 
resilient to political influences. 
No single cause can be identified to explain the current problems of tripartite social 
dialogue. As has been mentioned earlier, it experienced similar difficulties in the context of 
the economic crisis of the early 1990s, which would support arguments that the lack of 
resources for exchanges among social partners partly explains the crisis. The change in 
government in November 2011 marked a discontinuity in the process of social dialogue, 
with the new Government effectively abandoning any attempt to engage in a meaningful 
process of tripartite social dialogue. The Government’s stand on dialogue thus also helps to 
account for the recent social dialogue dynamics in Spain.  
Furthermore, the legitimacy dimension of tripartite social dialogue seems to be 
particularly important in explaining recent developments. Exogenous pressures to 
implement reforms and austerity programmes have to a certain degree reduced the need to 
seek domestic consensus and legitimacy. As a consequence of the sovereign debt crisis, 
legitimacy as an input as well as an output of tripartite social dialogue has been weakened. 
As policy actors, the social partners have been criticized by some sections of the 
population for their inability to address the country’s acute problems. Most importantly, 
the external imposition of economic and fiscal measures by a supranational entity (EU and 
EMU) and market pressures may have rendered the Governments’ external economic 
legitimacy (reputation) more important than internal social legitimacy. As a result, the 
Government’s perception of the benefits it can gain from tripartite social dialogue seems to 
have dramatically decreased. The abandonment of tripartite social dialogue has not only 
translated into the adoption of policies that have met strong social opposition, but has also 
affected future prospects for bipartite social dialogue. 
The impact of tripartite social dialogue on the content and direction of reforms 
during the current economic crisis has not been as significant as it has been in other 
periods. Tripartite engagement preceding the approval of policies on the labour market, 
industrial relations, social security, industrial and environmental policy took place by 
2011. The only exceptions in this regard were general economic policy and the austerity 
packages, on which no social dialogue occurred. Although only one important tripartite 
agreement was reached as a result, the tripartite social dialogue that took place allowed the 
Government to incorporate elements coming out from the discussions into its own reform 
measures. With the change in the Government in November 2011, tripartite social dialogue 
has been abandoned and this has been accompanied by a shift in the orientation of reforms 
affecting the labour market and industrial relations. 
Regarding the ways for revitalizing tripartite social dialogue, two main approaches 
can be advanced. The first stresses the need for trade unions and employers to enhance 
their implementation capacity. As has already been mentioned, one of the common 
criticisms of the social partners has to do with their problems in enforcing the terms of 
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agreements negotiated and monitoring their implementation. This is related to the 
organizational characteristics of the social partners as well as to the country’s production 
structure which consists mainly of SMEs where worker representation is very limited or 
inexistent. The lack of organizational linkages hinders not only implementation (Molina 
2008), but also the elaboration of effective policies as it limits knowledge at the peak of 
conditions at lower levels. In other words, a condition for stable tripartism is the 
organizational coordination of the actors involved (Crouch 1993). 
The second approach stresses the need to further institutionalize tripartite relations. 
Even though the most representative trade unions and employer organizations in Spain 
participate in several tripartite bodies in areas such as social security, training and public 
employment services, historically trade unions have demanded the further 
institutionalization of social dialogue. A first step in this process came with the creation of 
the Social and Economic Council in 1991. This tripartite body plays a purely consultative 
role for socio-economic issues. Similar bodies have also been created at regional and even 
local level. The trade unions’ demand is to reinforce existing instances of participation in 
order to reduce the volatility and highly contingent character of tripartite social dialogue. 
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